Antedating comments htm
It was attended to confidently by Professor Libet -- Subjective Antedating of a Sensory Experience and Mind-Brain Theories: Reply to Honderich.The reply in turn got a response -- Honderich's 'Is The Mind Ahead of the Brain -- Rejoinder to Benjamin Libet'.Abstract: Libet et al., like Popper & Eccles, have the view that some single hypothesis about the time of occurrence of a conscious sensory experience has certain consequences for various mind-brain theories.The view involves a fundamental inconsistency, which may cast doubt on certain experimental findings. The preferable hypothesis, which itself is doubtful, has been thought to have mind-brain consequences principally because it has not been distinguished from the other and different hypothesis.He wouldn’t give you a ticket to see Halley’s Comet.” The matter is somewhat confused because of another known sense of the word.
Others have confirmed that this term was indeed at one time in use in the trade, though it is long defunct.
, to show why it has been supposed that the hypothesis is evidence against an identity theory of mind and brain and the theory of psychophysical lawlike correlation, and evidence for "the self-conscious mind"; What is maintained by the authors derives from two sets of findings (1.1 to 1.3 and 2.1 to 2.4 below) pertaining to neuronal activity and to the temporal order of a subject’s pairs of sensory experiences, and also from (3) findings having to do with a "primary" evoked potential in somatosensory cortex.
Very roughly, findings 1.1 to 1.3 are to the effect that there is a certain delay in sensory experience, but finding 2.1 apparently conflicts with this.
What is said to be delayed, to repeat, is precisely the physical condition of "neuronal adequacy", as distinct from the experience itself, whatever is to be said of its time.
(2.1) If a single-pulse stimulus to skin at just above threshold level is applied after (say 0.2 or 0.3 sec) the beginning of a stimulus train direct to somatosensory cortex, it would be expected that subjects would report that conscious experience for the skin stimulus began after conscious experience for the cortical stimulus.